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He lays especial stress, too, upon the necessity of measuring a religious experience by its social value. At times one would imagine that he is teaching a philosophy of religion based upon the moral experience rather than one based upon mystical experiences. For he would interpret each experience in the light of history; he would judge it by its social fruits; he is as insistent as Inge that the *via negativa* is an illusory by-path; his eyes are open to suggestion and pathological conditions as factors that constantly recur. What actually does happen in mystical experiences, however, we are not unequivocally told. The differentia of mysticism is properly given as "emphasis upon an immediate awareness," or "direct and intimate consciousness, of the Divine Presence." This must signify a process of knowing that transcends the mediacy of memory, inference, and verification by history and by the intellectual co-operation that is called science. At its core, then, the mystical experience, as far as it is mystical, is intellectualistic and individualistic. It involves, as the author is aware, a movement toward a relatively undifferentiated consciousness, but this is an a-moral or pre-moral consciousness. The whole significance of the moral will depends upon the analytic attitude of mind, just as everything truly social depends upon the recognition of individuals.

These difficulties force mysticism here, as in many cases, into the doctrine that common experiences, such as conscience, faith, and prayer, are really mystical. But where now are the special marks of immediacy and undifferentiatedness? It is encouraging to note that the next volume is to exhibit the social spirit as the very "hall-mark" of the Quaker fellowship. Without undue hazard one may predict that the relation of this social spirit to faith in God will display the mediacy of the ordinary religious consciousness rather than the immediacy that mysticism claims for itself. In the end we may conclude that there is a divine immediacy in all moral experience, but such a generalized immediacy is not mystical.

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SOME FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS OF MODERN THEOLOGY

The vital problems which the systematic theologian today must face are largely due to the recent thoroughgoing application of scientific methods in the investigation of religion. An unusually able and thoroughgoing discussion of this aspect of theological scholarship has been given by Professor Hunziger,¹ of Leipzig. He has collected into one volume five

¹*Probleme und Aufgabe der gegenwärtigen systematischen Theologie.* Von A. W. Hunziger. Leipzig: Deichert. 1909. 199 pages. M. 3.60.

essays, which deal with the dogmatic and apologetic task of theology in view of modern methods of investigation. While conservative in spirit, the author is genuinely critical and scientific in method. The book is thus significant as showing where the fundamental issue lies in the thought of conservative theologians.

The first three essays all deal with the *religionsgeschichtliche* ideal. Troeltsch's programme for the doctrinal construction of theology on the basis of historical study is subjected to a minute and searching criticism. Hunziger shows that neither history nor psychology nor epistemology can give a normative conception of religion, as, indeed, Troeltsch admits. The inductive method forbids one to select any one phenomenon as the standard by which to value all the rest. All must be impartially admitted to consideration. This, of course, means that Christianity must be placed on the same basis with other religions. And since the conclusions of the above inductive sciences are never mathematically complete, we can never by this method reach the conception of the finality of the Christian religion.

The point of criticism is that Troeltsch makes no place for an unquestionable absoluteness of Christianity. Now Hunziger holds that Christianity must stand or fall with the doctrine of its absoluteness. A religion which is regarded as simply relative has already lost its power; for the confession of relativity means that either explicitly or implicitly search is being made for something relatively higher. The *religionsgeschichtliche* school, therefore, cannot supply a valid dogmatic. The argument is parallel to that which was set forth so cogently by Professor Mackintosh in this *Journal* (October, 1909).

After thus exposing what he regards as the fatal weakness of the inductive, historical method, Hunziger proceeds to outline his own programme. He admits that absoluteness cannot be maintained on the orthodox basis of authority. It must be found in the content of Christianity rather than in scriptural authority. The essential center of Christianity he finds in the belief that in Christ we have a unique and complete mediator between God and man. But since historical science as such cannot recognize any historical event or person as unique, we cannot expect from history a defense of the absoluteness of real Christianity. It is only in the inner Christian experience of redemption that one realizes the divine, supernatural nature of Christ. In this appeal Hunziger avowedly follows Frank and Ihmels. From the experience of regeneration we may derive the right to make metahistorical affirmations. In this way a distinctly *Christian* world-view arises through faith. This religious view is based on experience just as really as is secular science. But it is not capable of being cogently

proved true to all men, as is the scientific world-view. Its truth appears only to the regenerate soul. The proper task of apologetics is to show how this Christian world-view is not only consistent with, but is actually superior to, any non-religious secular philosophy. This task is most suggestively outlined in the last essay in the volume.

One who sympathizes with the historical and inductive method is led by the reading of this book to feel that the time is at hand when both conservative and radical scholars can helpfully co-operate in the truer apprehension of theological problems. When the appeal to technical authority is abandoned for an honest investigation in the empirical spirit, the conservative has adopted a method which commands universal respect. And it is of great value to have the presuppositions of the radicals pointed out in this critical way. The radical's tendency to deny the possibility of uniqueness or of the supernatural by a priori axioms is surely no more defensible than is an a priori appeal to technical authority.

On the other hand, one is led to ask whether the conservative is quite justified in his insistence that Christianity must stand or fall with the assertion or abandonment of its absoluteness in a quantitative or static sense. Everyone is now ready to recognize that the religion of the Bible is not discredited when the doctrine of unique infallibility is abandoned. The Bible retains its greatness when frankly recognized to be historically conditioned literature. We are past the day when the essence of Christianity was located in a supernaturally infallible book. But when Hunziger (p. 109) argues that if we have no absolute standard, our judgments must be recognized as *false*, he is simply setting up again the fallen scarecrow. The conclusions of natural science are only relatively accurate; but to call them on that account false would be absurd. Why argue that a relative religious judgment is false? Again, when Hunziger in his apologetic deals with the realm of natural science, where the theological issue is not so new, he recognizes that Christianity does not stand or fall with the acceptance or abandonment of the doctrine of unique and special miracles. God's revelation may be seen—indeed, must be seen—just as truly in the uniform process of nature as in exceptions to that order. Faith demands that what God does in any instance shall be consistent with all his other activity. A miracle which “contradicts” nature would be a source of religious perplexity rather than of confidence. One wonders why the same argument is not applicable to the person and work of Christ. If it does not destroy Christian faith to classify so-called miracles with the order of nature, so that one consistent world-process shall be recognized, why should it destroy Christianity if the personality of Jesus be interpreted as

the fulfilment of possibilities latent in human life rather than as the unique exception? Finally, if as Hunziger contends, the absoluteness of Christianity can be maintained only as the result of a specially defined religious experience, what is to guarantee that this special religious experience rather than a different type is the true one and free from illusion? Is not the appeal to a supernatural (and therefore authoritative) religious experience exposed to all the critical difficulties which have led our author to the abandonment of the appeal to a supernatural (and therefore authoritative) Bible? To have clearly suggested these queries is a real service; and Hunziger's book is to be welcomed as a valuable aid to the better understanding of fundamental problems before us today.

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In the treatise of the French critic, Saintyves,² the question of miracles is treated as a problem in epistemology. The miracle is defined as a rare or even unique fact, considered, by him who believes in it, to surpass the powers of sensible nature, animate or inanimate, and therefore implying the intervention of a supernatural being, diabolic, angelic, or divine, and attesting, moreover, the religious value of a person, a doctrine, or a revelation. The question raised is not, Are miracles possible? but, Even if they were performed, would it be possible for us to recognize them as miracles in the sense defined above?

The book is divided into four parts, the first of which deals with miracles and historical criticism. The historian as such is entitled simply to pronounce upon the reality of the facts. It does not rest with him to say whether or not a historical event which has a marvelous character is truly supernatural. After the stories of miracles have been subjected to all possible historical tests, comparatively few will remain with a valid claim to acceptance as historically true. Of the biblical miracles, fully nine-tenths fail to commend themselves as truly historical, even if the historian cannot absolutely deny their reality. Of the remaining tenth, few are certain on grounds of history alone; they are confirmed by the fact that similar occurrences are known to modern science—but then, this does not establish them as miracles in the sense of the definition.

This brings us to the second division, which treats of miracles and scientific criticism. The task of the scientist is to seek to discover in any given fact elements of similarity by means of which to classify it with other

²*Le discernement du miracle.* Par Pierre Saintyves. Paris: Nourry, 1909. 357 pages. Fr. 6.

known facts, as instances of a general law. Once the rare fact has gained scientific acceptance, it no longer even seems to be miraculous, and so becomes useless for the purposes of the theologian. And with regard to any extraordinary fact not yet classifiable under any known law, the scientist cannot, by his methods of observation and experimentation, discover it to be supernaturally caused; nor, on the other hand, can he as scientist deny either that the fact is miraculous or that it may yet be discovered to be miraculous by some other methods than his own.

Coming next to miracles and philosophical criticism, we find philosophy set forth as the science or rational critique of conscious experience as such. It deals with consciousness, and with existence in so far as it is related to consciousness. Here it is maintained that philosophy can give no criterion by which the action of an extra-terrestrial consciousness could be known to be such, as distinguished from that of some human consciousness. It cannot be shown that supernatural intervention has occurred to secure the ends of justice or mercy, even if some "rare facts" have been instrumental in these directions, for there is no general law connecting such facts with such results. If it be claimed that miracle is supernatural intervention occurring only in response to faith, it may be objected that it cannot be shown that the faith is not itself the efficient cause of those extraordinary cures of disease which sometimes do occur under such conditions, and this especially as the object in which the faith is reposed seems to be a matter of indifference. The hypothesis of a supernatural agent operating through the human subliminal self may be met by the alternative possibility of the subconscious agency of some human personality. And even if God were to manifest himself in an apparition, philosophy could find no criterion by which it could be sure that it was really God who had appeared.

Finally the claims of theological criticism are considered. Theology must confine itself to religious metaphysics; it has no right to dogmatize as to what is or is not a scientific or historical fact. The facts being given, however, it can pass upon their value from the standpoint of a particular religious faith. Practically all religions have their stories of miracle, and each religion has claimed those to be true miracles which support its doctrine, all others being either diabolical or unreal. This evaluation is manifestly not impartial, and so cannot be granted more than subjective significance. Not even theology, then, can give us any criterion for knowing that any particular event has been supernaturally produced.

Some reflections, critical and supplementary, are suggested. For so elaborate and intelligent a treatment of the subject, the outcome is not very satisfactory. The fault seems to lie chiefly in the procedure and in the

general point of view controlling it. It seems to be assumed that the present religious interest in the question of miracles is adequately represented by traditional theology, and this has stood for the defense of much that is now seen to have a very precarious basis in history, science, and philosophy. But the modern religious spirit is not concerned to find a special manifestation of the divine in the extraordinary, unless it be extraordinary in moral goodness. As against atheism, which finds God nowhere, and pantheism, which finds him equally manifested in everything, good or bad, modern theistic religion claims the right to regard God as dynamically related to all reality, but to discover a progressive expression of his character and purpose in the moral progress of humanity. From this point of view the divine does not coincide with the unintelligible or marvelous, and questions about alleged miraculous events religion may confidently leave to historical and scientific investigation. But neither the historian nor the scientist can complete his task without the other. Scientific possibility must be used to some extent as a criterion of historical fact, and historical fact as a criterion of scientific possibility. Finally, it is the part of constructive philosophy to elaborate a world-view which will do justice both to the scientific postulate of the intelligibility of reality and to the religious postulate of the progressive immanence of God in the moral progress of humanity.

Fonsegrive's essays³ are of some interest as showing the Catholic mind, with its Thomistic philosophy, in reaction upon and largely against modern philosophical thought. There are four of these essays, dated at intervals from 1892 to 1908, and entitled as follows: "The Unknowable in Modern Philosophy," "Generalization and Induction," "Kantianism and Contemporary Thought," and "Certitude and Truth."

The first essay, in opposition to the current critical doctrine that we can know only phenomena and their laws, advocates the view that we know our own existence immediately; that we know the existence of such other things as our experience brings us into touch with, as necessary to explain elements in our experience which we do not ourselves cause; that we know God's existence as that of the First Cause; and, finally, that we know essences, imperfectly and by analogy, it is true, and yet well enough to tell the objects apart.

In the second essay we see what psychology becomes when it is the bondservant of dogmatism. It is maintained that the concept is formed immediately by intuition when sense impressions arrive at the intellect;

³*Essais sur la connaissance.* Par George Fonsegrive. Paris: Gabalda et Cie., 1909, iv + 271 pages. Fr. 3.50.

generalization is simply the recognition that the intuitive concept is universal and therefore valid of future as well as of past experience; and induction is but a special sort of this dogmatic generalization. Furthermore, it being admitted that intellectual intuition attains to some scientific truths, it can easily be granted, so it is contended, that it attains to metaphysical truths as well. Thus the metaphysical dogmatism as end justifies the intuitional psychology as means!

The third essay exhibits the universal Catholic antipathy to the Kantian system as a whole; but there is an attempt to combine the Kantian critical doctrine of the relativity of human knowledge with the scholastic Aristotelianism, and thus to avoid subjectivism. The conclusion is that while we know what we know as a function of ourselves, and while we have no complete knowledge of anything, we nevertheless do know something, even if how this is possible remains an insoluble mystery.

In the last essay truth is defined as the equation of the thing and the idea. Knowledge of the truth implies certainty; but there may be psychological certainty with reference to what is untrue. The problem then is to arrive at a logically valid certainty. This is accomplished by making use of certain tests. Here, in addition to the usual logical criteria, social confirmation is emphasized as making certainty more logical. "Every man who adheres to my faith gives me a new cause for believing it."

But there is a further question, How can we be sure that this logically legitimate certainty corresponds to a reality beyond our minds? This is the metaphysical problem. The solution offered is the same as in the first essay. The scholastic principle, that the cause resembles the effect, is rejected, however, as untenable (although apology is made for differing in this from Thomas Aquinas), and this means that knowledge is much more limited than the schoolmen would have admitted. How convenient this relativizing of scientific knowledge becomes, in view of the conflict between modern science and ecclesiastical dogma! It is evident that these "Essays on Knowledge" are intended as the vanguard of a modern Catholic apologetic. In the last few pages of the volume that man of straw, pragmatism as it is popularly understood, is easily overthrown.

An interesting book for the student of religious epistemology is the recent work of K. Dunkmann,⁴ the principal of the Royal College for Preachers, in Wittenberg. The task which the author sets himself is to show the place of theological knowledge in a system of all knowledge. Theology is either a knowledge of reality in the same sense in which we

⁴ *System theologischer Erkenntnislehre*. Von K. Dunkmann. Leipzig: Deichert, 1919. vi+166 pages. M. 3.50.

know other reality, or else it is not knowledge at all. There must be no special religious epistemology seeking a refuge for theology between these alternatives. The acuteness of the problem is revealed when the author indicates his acceptance of the Kantian criteria of knowledge with its doctrine of relativity and its rejection of constructive metaphysics, especially as Kant himself allowed theology no place in his system as knowledge. The way of escape by regarding religious judgments as practical rather than theoretical is rejected on the ground that what is simply practical is merely individual instead of universal, and so not knowledge at all. How, then, can religion, which is commonly viewed as a particular phenomenon alongside of others, come to have universal significance for the life of the spirit? How can the affirmations of religion be real knowledge?

The author boldly cuts the Gordian knot. It is not a proper view of religion to regard it as a functional peculiarity of the spirit; in its very essence religion *is* knowledge of God. In religious consciousness the self is recognized as the object of an all-embracing knowledge. Things are viewed religiously when viewed as manifest to an all-seeing eye. In the religious way alone do we know that God exists; we know him only as knowing us.

Here Dunkmann seems to have followed Hegel in making the transition from Kant's *regulative* "transcendental unity of apperception" to the metaphysical idealism which regards it as constituting the ultimate reality. Hegel himself expressed this in religious terms in the well-known passage: "Man knows God only in so far as God himself knows himself in man. This knowledge is God's self-consciousness, but it is at the same time a knowledge of God on the part of man and the knowledge of God by man is a knowledge of man by God. The spirit of man whereby he knows God, is simply the spirit of God himself." It is this general conception which Dunkmann reads into his introspective psychology; he then universalizes it as belonging to the history of religion, with the result that the essence of religion is conceived in an intellectualistic way as a definite form of knowledge. In fact it is explicitly stated that theology is not to be rigidly distinguished from religion.

The problem of the historical genesis of religion is repudiated. Religion did not *arise*; it is there as a *revelation* from the beginning of reflective consciousness. Historical revelation occurs when we know ourselves in our historical experience as known by God. The task of theology today is to reduce theology to the Christian religious knowledge of salvation, and to make that scientifically clear.

The combination of elements in this point of view is peculiar, and will

probably not meet with general acceptance. The combination of the Hegelian intellectualism with the Kantian and Ritschlian rejection of metaphysics is somewhat novel. A more excellent way, perhaps, would be to view not only religious but all knowledge in its voluntaristic aspect, and to proceed to use the essential postulates of religion as philosophical hypotheses in the attempt to mediate between religion and other essential interests of life.

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THE PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF RELIGION

A new course of lectures on "The Religions of the World" has recently been established by the Hartford Theological Seminary, the first series of which¹ was given last year by Mr. Frank Byron Jevons, of Durham University. The aim of these Hartford lectures is to furnish students who are preparing for the foreign missionary field with "a good knowledge of the religious history, beliefs, and customs of the peoples among whom they expect to labor." Or, as Mr. Jevons puts it in his introductory lecture, the aim of the series is to be found in an "applied science of religion." Such an applied science will accept the facts which the pure science of religion presents and will base itself upon them. "The business of the science of religion is to discover all the facts necessary if we are to understand the growth and history of religion. The business of the applied science is, in our case, to use the discovered facts as a means of showing that Christianity is the highest manifestation of the religious spirit."

The plan of Mr. Jevons' book can hardly be said to be well adapted to the purpose thus enunciated. There are lectures on "Immortality," "Magic," "Fetichism," "Prayer," "Sacrifice," and "Morality," but until the last lecture ("Christianity") is reached little is said to show that "Christianity is the highest manifestation of the religious spirit." Nor can it be said that the author's attempts to adapt his scholarly discussions to the uses of the missionary are always fortunate. The "application," coming at the end of an academic discussion, often seems very obviously tagged on, like the moral used as an excuse for a good story.

The point of view which gives unity to the series of lectures is found in the insistence that religion is never purely individual but always social.

¹*Introduction to the Study of Comparative Religion*, being Vol. I of the Hartford-Lamson Lectures on the Religions of the World. By Frank Byron Jevons. New York: Macmillan, 1908. xxv+283 pages. \$1.50.